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STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS:
THE COMPANY'S ROLE, AND A SUGGESTION
GEORGE T. WASHINGTON*
When a stockholder brings a derivative action to redress some real or
alleged abuse in the conduct of his corporation's affairs, he is, at least in theory,
merely acting in the place and stead of the company. The corporation itself,
supposedly the true plaintiff, is in an anomalous position. As a "legal entity"
it should be interested in the protection of its rights, and, whether the stock-
holder's suit is aimed against directors, officers, or third parties, it should
welcome any addition to its funds or property which the litigation is able to
produce. From the practical point of view, of course, the acts of the corpora-
tion are those of its management, and the very conditions under which a
stockholder's suit is brought usually indicate complete lack of sympathy on
the part of the management with the alleged cause of action. The executives
are generally of the firm opinion that the stockholder's suit is "against the
best interests of the corporation," and that active steps should be taken on
behalf of the company to prevent any further damage from being done. The
protesting stockholder has the equally firm belief that if the corporation does
anything at all it should be in aid of the prosecution of the action; nothing
makes him more indignant than to see the defense supported by corporate
power and corporate funds. Shortly after the commencement of the action,
counsel for the corporation will probably be asked whether the company may
assist the individual defendants. Similarly, one of the first tasks confronting
complainant's counsel is very often that of resisting procedural steps taken
in the company's name. After reviewing the part which the corporation may
play in stockholders' actions, with particular reference to efforts by the
management to suppress suits which are regarded as malevolent or harmful,
the writer would like to discuss a possible means by which corporate funds
and power may be put to a somewhat different use in dealing with stockholders'
grievances.
I. The Corporation as a Party Litigant in Stockholders' Suits
The accepted theory upon which stockholders' derivative actions are based
does not of itself provide a complete answer to our inquiry as to the company's
role. It is commonly said that since the stockholder has no remedy at law,
equity permits him to maintain suit in behalf of the corporation, joining the
latter as a defendant to protect the real defendants from a subsequent suit
by the corporation, and to make sure that the corporation receives the funds
*For valuable criticisms of the manuscript of this paper, the writer is indebted to his
colleagues, Dean Robert S. Stevens, Professor Arthur J. Keeffe, and Herbert R. Baer, Esq.
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recovered.1 Occasionally, it is stated that the stockholder's action is of a dual
nature, in that the stockholder must first show that the body corporate
(acting through its constituted authorities) has been guilty of a breach of
duty to the stockholders by failing to sue, and, secondly, must show a cause
of action in behalf of the corporation against the actual defendants.2 Thus,
it may be argued that the corporation is a defendant as to the first cause of
action and a plaintiff as to the second. If this theory were adopted, the
corporation could assist the plaintiff, or could actively defend on the ground,
and only on the ground, that the corporation was justified in its failure to bring
suit. However, this would seem to be too narrow an approach, in view of some
of the cases to be discussed below.
The corporation must be named and served as a party defendant,3 a require-
ment which, as we shall see, may work great hardship upon the complaining
stockholder. However, the courts commonly speak of the company as a
"nominal defendant," and indicate plainly that in their view it should take a
very limited part in the litigation, at least if it desires to aid the individual
defendants.4 In the usual case, it need not -answer or take any other step
in the proceedings. 5  Ideally, the company should be impartial, or perhaps
aid the plaintiff if it finds his cause to be just." And, in fact, the management
sometimes honestly wishes to take a neutral position. After the Pecora
'Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626, 21 L. ed. 938 (1874); Willoughby v. Chicago
Junction Railways & Union Stockyards Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 656, 25 Atl. 277 (1892). In
Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, 83 AUt. 307 (1912), the court gives the additional reason that
the company is entitled to notice "in order that its interests and the rights of its creditors
might be protected." See also Hanrahan v. Andersen, 108 Mont. 218, 90 P. (2d)
494 (1939).
'Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 X. Y. 215, 218, 11 N. E. (2d) 883 (1937); BALLANTIME,
Co1 oRATIoNs (1927) 611-612; 13 FLETcHER, COUOATIONS' (1931) § 5946. Cf. Mc-
Laughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit (1938) 26 GEo. L. 3. 878, 898, where
the author rejects the theory that the stockholder has a personal grievance against the
corporation because of its failure to bring suit, pointing out that the plaintiff in a
derivative suit never asks damages for himself but always for the corporation. On the
necessity of prior demand by complainant on directors or stockholders that suit be brought
by the corporation, see infra notes 58 and 59.
*On the necessity of joinder of the corporation in stockholders' representative suits,
see note, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1091; STEvENS, Coa'oRATIos (1936) 671. On joinder
of a dissolved corporation, see 13 FLETCrER, CORORATIONS (1931) § 5997; of a corpora-
tion which has been consolidated with another, see Arnstein v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
18 F. Supp. 916 (E. D. N. Y. 1937). On service of process, see infra note 12.
'See Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, 109 Me. 403, 84 AtI. 892 (1912); Meyers v.
Smith, 190 Minn. 157, 251 N. W. 20 (1933), noted, (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 661; Apfel v.
Auditore, 223 App. Div. 457, 228 N. Y. Supp. 489 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd w.o.op., 250 N. Y.
600, 166 N. E. 339 (1929) ; Young v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 112 App. Div. 760, 762,
98 N. Y. Supp. 1052 (3d Dep't 1906). Cf. cases cited infra notes 18 and 19.
'Failure to answer ordinarily cannot harm the corporation, since no relief is asked
against it in the complaint and no judgment by default can be taken. See Young v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., supra note 4, at 762. Sometimes, of course, a receivership is
asked, in which event the corporation's right to defend itself is clear. See infra note 18.
See also Weiland v. N. W. Distilleries, Inc., 203 Minn. 600, 281 N. W. 364 (1938), on the




investigation had brought to light a number of unfortunate episodes in the
history of a large bank in New York City, several stockholders brought
derivative actions (later consolidated) against the directors who had authorized
the transactions in question. The board, which at the time the suits were
brought had partly changed in membership, instructed a committee of directors
to investigate, through independent counsel, the allegations made.6 The
bank, which had been joined as a party defendant in the action, served a short
answer, submitting its rights to the court.7 Doubtless many instances could
be found in which the company's management has sought to take an impartial
attitude.
Occasionally, also, the corporation may offer active aid to the plaintiff-
perhaps because a new management has come into control of the business.
In such a situation, according to the recent case of General Investment Corp. v.
Addinsel, the company cannot formally assume the status of co-plaintiff,
even with the consent of the complaining shareholder.8 Yet it seems clear
that the company can informally assist the plaintiff, and take an active part
in the prosecution, at any stage in the proceedings. 9 The practical question
then arises as to whether the stockholder or the corporation should control
the action, especially with reference to the selection of trial counsel. The
General Investment case would indicate that the shareholder, as sole plaintiff,
'See N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1934, p. 36, col. 3; ibid., Jan. 10, 1934, p. 1, col. 3.
'The answer took the following form, as shown by the record in Bookbinder v. Chase
National Bank of New York, 244 App. Div. 650, 280 N. Y. Supp. 393 (1st Dep't 1935):
"The defendant, The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, for its answer to
the amended complaint, submits its rights to the Court and asks the Court to make suchjudgment and decree herein with respect to the defendant bank as may be just and proper."
(Record, p. 586.) Technically, of course, this is not an "answer" at all, since it does not
comply with the requirements of local practice (N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 241, 261). But
it seems clear that the corporation need not answer or plead; see supra note 5. The suit
mentioned above was ultimately settled. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1938, p. 11, col. 2.
8255 App. Div. 319, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 377, 255 App. Div. 962, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 671 (1st
Dep't 1938), corporation's motion for joinder as coplaintiff denied; individual defendants
resisted motion. The opinion of the court is not persuasive; there seems no real reason
for refusing to permit the corporation to join as coplaintiff, unless perhaps the defendants
have raised defenses based on the complaining stockholder's personal lack of capacity to
sue, and there is thought to be some compelling policy in favor of protecting them in
these defenses. From Bachrach v. General Investment Corp., 29 F. Supp. 966, 967 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939), it appears that the Investment Corporation later began a separate suit
in the state courts. See also Weiss v. Addinsell, 103 N. Y. L. J. 1096, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.,
N. Y. County, March 9, 1940) ; O'Brien v. King, - App. Div. -, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 44
(1st Dep't 1940). Cf. Loeb v. Berman, 217 Cal. 716, 20 P. (2d) 685 (1933), where the
corporation filed a cross-complaint against the individual defendants; the corporation's
receiver later took over the action, and the original plaintiffs were considered super-
numerary parties. See also Russell v. Weyand, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 259, 42 P. (2d) 381(1935).
'See Sheridan v. Sheridan Electric Light Co., 38 Hun 396 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., General
Term, 1st Dep't 1886), where the corporation filed no answer to the suit; it later aided
the plaintiff, being permitted to take an appeal from a judgment for the defendants;
Block (Noma Electric Corp.) v. Block, 102 N. Y. L. J. 1142, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., N. Y.
County, Oct. 16, 1939).
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should have the deciding voice, but in the event of a serious disagreement the
trial court would doubtless have authority to settle the dispute, at the instance
of either the company or the stockholder.'0 The complaining stockholder,
rather than the corporation, is of course entitled normally to control the
conduct of the litigation.'1
Suppose the company's management says, "We simply want to protect the
corporation's interests." That is a safe and sound attitude, but one which in
practice seems to operate to the advantage of the individual defendants and to
the detriment of the complainant. For instance, the corporation may appear
specially to object to lack of proper service of process upon it.'2  It is said
that the company is entitled to insist that it be treated as an ordinary defendant
in determining what service is to be deemed sufficient. Suppose, then, that
the complaining stockholder and all the directors are in New York, while the
corporation is incorporated in and doing business in New Jersey. If suit is
started in New York and the company is not doing business there, it can
appear specially and have the attempted service on it set aside. The suit then
fails for lack of a necessary party. If the plaintiff starts suit in New Jersey,
he will hardly get very far, because sufficient service cannot be obtained
there against the individual defendants. Under these circumstances, the
stockholder's opportunity for redress is very seriously curtailed.' 3 It would
"-In Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N. Y. Supp.
360 (2d Dep't 1934), rev'g 148 Misc. 541, 265 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1933), the court
indicated that where two stockholders were attempting to maintain separate derivative
suits on the same cause of action, the trial court should reserve control, with power in
its discretion to dismiss the second action brought, to consolidate both actions, or to allow
both to continue. Similarly, in Wile v. Burns Bros., 239 App. Div. 59, 265 N. Y. Supp.
461 (1st Dep't 1933), s.c., 239 App. Div. 67, 265 N. Y. Supp. 469, where an action by a
corporation against its directors to recover property allegedly misappropriated was being
controlled in the interests of the defendants and not being prosecuted in good faith, the
court held that a stockholder could maintain a separate suit on the same cause of action,
and granted an injunction against the prosecution of the first suit. See note (1934) 19
CORNELL L. Q. 300; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 676, 678.
'Planten v. National Nassau Bank, 174 App. Div. 254, 259, 160 N. Y. Supp. 297 (1st
Dep't 1916), aff'd w.o.op., 220 N. Y. 677, 116 N. E. 1070 (1917). See also STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS (1936) 675-678, and cases cited supra notes 8, 9, and 10.
"Goldberg v. Emanuel, 254 App. Div. 556, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 946 (1st Dep't 1938),
rev'g 166 Misc. 610, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (1938); Freeman v. Bean, 243 App. Div.
503, 276 N. Y. Supp. 310 (1st Dep't 1934), one judge dissenting, aff'd w.o.op., 266 N. Y.
657, 195 N. E. 368 (1935) ; Grant v. Cobre Grande Copper Co., 126 App. Div. 750, 111
N. Y. Supp. 386 (1st Dep't 1908), two judges disenting, rev'd on other grounds, 193 N. Y.
306, 86 N. E. 34 (1908).
'See dissenting opinion of Finch, P. J., in Freeman v. Bean, mpra note 12, at 503;
Black, 3., in Phillips v. Morgan, 100 N. Y. L. 3. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County,
Dec. 16, 1938). Cf. Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359, 373, 114 N. E. 841 (1916) ; Guggen-
heimer v. Beaver Board Companies, 136 Misc. 511, 240 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1930), aff'd
w.o.op., 229 App. Div. 717, 241 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1st Dep't 1930). Possible remedies for
the situation are suggested in notes, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1091, and (1935) 35 COL. L.
REv. 793. See also Winer, Jurisdiction over the Beneficiary Corporatiom in Stockholders'
Suits (1935) 22 VA. L. REv. 153. If the facts enable the stockholder to sue in the federal
courts, he may take advantage of 28 U. S. Code § 112, as amended April 16, 1936, establish-
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appear also that the corporation may move for a change of venue,1 4 or
to correct a misjoinder of causes of action, as where the stockholder has
improperly attempted to join an individual cause of action with one in behalf
of the-corporation.' 5  As to the foregoing matters, which may perhaps be
considered as legitimate endeavors by the corporation to see that its rights are
adjudicated in a proper court and on proper pleadings, the company seems to
be considered a true party defendant.' In another respect, however, it must
be considered a true plaintiff; it should not ordinarily be allowed to set up a
counterclaim against the complaining stockholderY.
ing a more liberal rule regarding service on the corporation. However, if the unfortunate
decision in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123, 53 Sup. Ct. 295, 77 L. ed. 652
(1933), is followed, under which a federal court may in certain situations refuse t6 take
jurisdiction over a stockholder's action, the advantage gained by § 112 may frequently be
nullified. Moreover, many stockholders' suits are excluded from the federal courts by
Rule 23 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (formerly Equity Rule 27). As to the
effect on Rule 23 (b) of the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,
58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938), see Summers v. Hearst, 23 F.
Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), noted, (1939) 37 Mica. L. REv. 654.
1 McHarg v. Commonwealth Finance Corp., 44 S. D. 144, 182 N. W. 705 (1921).
'Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, 111 N. E. 229 (1915), corporation joined in demurrer
based on misjoinder; demurrer sustained. Cf. Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52
(1882), corporation demurred, with other defendants, for want of jurisdiction, improper
joinder of parties, and other defects in the complaint; judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff on the demurrer, without discussion of the propriety of the corporation's activity
in the case. On the question of whether the corporation can by motion or answer raise the
objection that the complainant made no demand on the board of directors that suit be
brought, see Herrick v. Dempster, 73 N. J. Eq. 145, 75 AtI. 810 (1907) ; Marr v. Marr,
73 N. J. Eq. 643, 70 At. 375 (1907). Instances can be found in which the corporation
defended on this ground and no comment was made regarding the propriety of such
action on its part. See, for example, Flynn v. Brooklyn City R. R., 158 N. Y. 493, 53
N. E. 520 (1899) ; Boaz v. Sterling-worth Railway Supply Co., 68 App. Div. 1, 73 N. Y.
Supp. 1039 (1st Dep't 1902). On the related question of whether a corporation can raise
by plea or answer the contention that a demand to sue was rightly refused by the board,
see Groel v. United Electric Co. of N. J., infra notes 27 and 28, and connected text. Cf.
Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 8 N. E. (2d) 895 (Mass. 1937).
'The corporation has also been said to be a true party defendant in determining the
question of diversity of citizenship for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Doctor v. Harring-
ton, 196 U. S. 579, 25 Sup. Ct. 355, 49 L. ed. 606 (1905). However, the result reached
in Doctor v. Harrington would seemingly have been the same had the corporation been
considered purely a neutral party. Cf. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRacvIcE (1938) 2270 et seq.
That the rule in Doctor v. Harrington has not been affected by the decision in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, supra note 13, see J. R. A. Corporation v. Boylan, 30 F. Supp. 393
(S. D. N. Y. 1939), noted, (1940) 38 Mica,. L. REv. 724. Cf. Johnson v. Ingersoll, 63 F.
(2d) 86 (C. C. A. 7th 1933), corporation's interest, and not complainant stockholder's
interest, determines amount involved for purposes of federal jurisdiction; State ex rel. St.
Louis Amusement Co. v. Rosskopf, 330 Mo. 1078, 52 S. W. (2d) 178 (1932), interests of
corporation and individual defendants are conflicting, and not similar, on question of
supplying appeal bond.
Vas Nunes v. Schwab, 129 Misc. 404, 221 N. Y. Supp. 339 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County,
1927), counterclaim alleging stockholder was in debt to corporation on account of an un-
paid stock subscription must be stricken out, since the corporation "is in reality the
plaintiff in the action." But see Lloyd, Jr. v. Beardsley, Sr., 102 N. Y. L. J. 2077, col.
6 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County, Dec. 11, 1939), noted, (1940) 53 HARV. L. REV. 689, where
the company was permitted to interpose a counterclaim asking an injunction to compel the
complainant to return a list of the company's customers. See also Miller v. Friedman,
103 N. Y. L. J. 1027, col. 5 (App. Div., 2d Dep't March 5, 1940). Representative actions
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There is another field in which "protection of the company's interests" may
incidentally provide substantial aid to the individual defendants. The clearest
case is where the complaining stockholder seeks to sequester the assets of the
corporation and interrupt its normal business. It is now well settled that the
company can actively resist an application to place it in receivership, and can
pay counsel for so doing.' s This resistance can be very helpful to the defend-
ant directors in the conduct of their own case. Similarly, it has been held
that the corporation may actively defendagainst a suit seeking to set aside a
voluntary reorganization of the corporation's affairs, the court having found
that the reorganization was beneficial to the corporation and that successful
maintenance of the suit would have threatened "the impairment of the
corporation's assets."' 9
Often, of course, the corporation will endeavor to provide direct aid to
the defendant officers or directors. As has been indicated above, the manage-
ment and majority stockholders will in many instances-perhaps in most
instances-be sympathetic with .the defendant directors, or perhaps find
themselves joined as defendants. Even though they are not so joined, the
members of the present management will in all probability regard the suit as
a reflection on themselves, "on the administration." Under these circum-
stances, the temptation is very great to cause the corporation to aid the
defendants in every way possible. At the very least, the defendants will
should not as a general rule be impeded by counterclaims against the initiator of the suit
in his individual capacity. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 466. However, justice may
sometimes require that all controversies between the parties be settled in the same suit.
This was true in the Lloyd case, supra, where there were only three stockholders, all of
whom were parties to the action. Under New York practice, the court has power to
refuse the individual defendants permission to set up counterclaims against the corporation.
Ritter v. Mountain Camp Holding Corp., 252 App. Div. 602, 299 N. Y. Supp. 876 (lst
Dep't 1937) ; Burgess v. Stevens, 148 Misc. 450, 266 N. Y. Supp. 79 (Sup. Ct., Broome
County, 1933) (action under N. Y. GEar. CoRp. L. §§ 60, 61). Cf. Vas Nunes v. Schwab,
mpra; Noeller v. Duffy, 126 Misc. 799, 214 N. Y. Supp. 304 (Sup. Ct., Niagara County,
1926).
'Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 78, 168 N. Y. Supp. 251 (1st
Dep't 1917), aff'd w.o.op., 227 N. Y. 656, 126 N. E. 908 (1920). This decision should be
read in the light of the connected case of Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 153 App. Div.
697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236 (1st Dep't 1912), mod., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914).
Other receivership cases include Esposito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185,
191 N. E. 363 (1934) ; Atwater v. Elkhorn Valley Coal-Land Co., 184 App. Div. 253,
171 N. Y. Supp. 552 (1st Dep't 1918), aff'd w.o.op., 227 N. Y. 611, 125 N. E. 912 (1919).
And see Barnes v. Newcomb, 89 N. Y. 108 (1882)-not, however, a derivative action,
apparently. Contra, where appointment of receiver was for best interests of corporation,
Brock v. Automobile Livery & Sales Co., 137 La. 9, 68 So. 195 (1915). See also Wither-
spoon v. Hornbein, 70 Colo. 1, 196 Pac. 865 (1921).
"Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 226 Mass. 391, 115 N. E. 488 (1917), suit by minority
stockholder, but apparently not a derivative action; corporation and certain individuals
active in the reorganization were made defendants. See also Esposito v. Riverside Sand
& Gravel Co., supra note 18. Apparently, a corporation can resist an application for an
injunction to restrain payment of interest to bondholders. Continental Securities Co. v.
New York Central R. R., 179 App. Div. 355, 166 N. Y. Supp. 491 (2d Dep't 1917),
aff'd w.o.op., 222 N. Y. 650, 119 N. E. 1036 (1918).
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ordinarily have ready access to the company's books and papers. Often the
attorneys customarily retained by the corporation will represent the defendant
directors, thus giving the latter the benefit of special knowledge of the
company's affairs. The full resources of the corporation, financial and other-
wise, are very commonly made available to the individual defendants.2 0  This
does not necessarily mean a conspiracy to defeat justice, as the stockholder
and his attorney are likely to feel-though sometimes it amounts to exactly
that. The company's activity is due partly to the management's worry about
the situation from the standpoint of damage to the company's reputation and
their desire to "do something" about it, partly to the fact that if the corpora-
tioni is an active litigant, the individual defendants' legal bills may be
correspondingly reduced.
Any financial aid by the corporation to the individual defendants to assist
them in resisting the stockholder's suit must be regarded as improper; the
defendants have not yet successfully defended themselves on the merits, and
the corporation should not use its funds to protect them from attack.21
Similarly, it is improper for the company to set up defenses affirmatively
-See Berlack, Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute (1937) 35 MicH. L, REv. 597,
601-602, where the author states: "The corporation is a party defendant and must be
represented; and while the rule is that the expenses of the individual defendants cannot
be charged to the corporation, it is usually these very defendants who are in control of the
corporate treasury, and do not hesitate to call upon it, at least for the initial disbursement.
How much may be recovered from them later is conjectural. The cost of defense is quite
as great as the cost of prosecution, and often greater; attorneys for large and vulnerable
corporations do not work for pittances. But from the point of view of the defense, there
is the saving fact that the corporate treasury usually is supplied with enough cash to meet
the exigencies of the situation." The point made by Mr. Berlack is doubtless well taken
in a very large number of instances. In Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., supra
note 10, Davis, J., said (p. 245) : "Stockholders are widely scattered and have no definite
method of contact with each other. They usually know that the evidence is almost ex-
clusively in the control of those who are charged with delinquency; that those same
individuals are likewise in control of the funds of the corporation and may apply them in
defense of their acts, whether those acts are innocent or wrongful; that in seeking a
remedy the stockholder will be met with every obstacle and procedural delay that the
ingenuity of skilled counsel can devise, as is illustrated in the present case; and that the
litigation must entail on their part a great expense with the eventual result in doubt."
'McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 8th 1906); Wickersham v.
Crittenden, 106 Cal. 329, 39 Pac. 603 (1895) ; McConnell v. Combination M. & M. Co.,
31 Mont. 563, 79 Pac. 248 (1905) ; Chabot & Richard Co. v. Chabot, supra note 4; General
Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Guarantee Mortgage & Sec. Corp., 264 Mass. 253, 162 N. E.
319 (1928) ; Hooker, Corser & Mitchell Co. v. Hooker, 88 Vt. 335, 92 Atl. 443 (1914).
See also Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. N. S. 68 (La. Sup. Ct. 1829) ; s.c., on subsequent
appeal, 3 La. Sup. Ct. 0. S. 568 (1832). In none of the cases cited were the directors
found innocent of the charges made by the complaining stockholders. Even if they had
been, it seems clear that the corporation should not aid them prior to a court determination
of their lack of wrongdoing. See Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate Direc-
tors in Stockholders' Suits (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 431, where the writer discusses the
problem of granting reimbursement from corporate funds to directors who have success-
fully defended themselves on the merits of the suit. It may also be noted that the
corporation may protect its own interests (see cases cited supra notes 12-19), and this,
as was pointed out above, may incidentally aid the defendants.
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supporting the questioned activities of the individual defendants, 22 unless
perhaps it appears that such defense is necessary to protect the interests of
the corporation.3 This last exception is a narrow one. It may be argued
that the attack on the directors is an attack on the "business reputation" of the
corporation itself, indicating that it lacks good management, and that, there-
fore, the corporation, particularly if it is a financial institution seeking the
confidence of the public, should be allowed to make an active defense of the
challenged acts. However appealing this contention may be from a business
standpoint, it is not likely to be recognized by the courts. One case has said
that the argument at all events loses its force as soon as the stockholder's
complaint has been served, as it is then no longer possible to avoid any
damaging publicity which may result from the pendency of the suit.2 4 The
courts would also in all probability say that if the stockholder's suit is
eventually shown to be groundless, the directors' reputation -will have been
vindicated, whereas if the suit proves successful, the corporation cannot com-
plain of indirect harms due to unfavorable publicity. The whole tenor of the
cases is that the stockholder is entitled to a fair trial on the merits, without
having the power of the corporation turned against him. It must be noted,
however, that corporations have frequently interposed affirmative defenses and
actively supported them without the complaining stockholder or the court
itself having raised the point of whether the corporation was technically
entitled to do so. 2
5
'Meyers v. Smith, supra note 4: corporation pleaded affirmative defenses in behalf of
directors charged with wrongful expenditures; defenses stricken out on stockholder's
motion; individual defendants were in control of corporation. The court said: "The
corporation is a nominal party only. It was properly joined as a party for the protection
of the defendants .... But that does not vest in the corporation the right to here step in
and, by answer, attempt to defeat what is practically its own suit and causes of action.
Nor have the two individual defendants, in control thereof, any right to use the corpora-
tion for any such purpose or to impose on the corporation the burden of fighting their
battle." See also Levinson v. Rosoff, 98 N. Y. L. J. 1927 (Sup. Ct., Kings County, Dec.
1, 1937) (suit against directors under N. Y. Gen. Corp. L. § 60; corporation's defenses,
supporting directors, stricken out on motion) ; Harris v. State Bank of Williamson, 177
N. Y. Supp. 545, 548 (Sup. Ct., Wayne County, 1919) ; Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366,
375, 190 N. Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct., Wayne County, 1921), corporation interposed an
answer denying the complainant's personal capacity to bring suit; court in effect condemns
this procedure; Kaiser v. Niemeyer, 198 Wis. 581, 225 N. W. 188 (1929). Cf. Davis v.
Sirotowitz, infra note 23.
'See Davis v. Sirotowitz, 99 N. Y. L. J. 1195, col. 1 (Sup. Ct., Kings County, March 10,
1938), motion to strike out corporation's answer denied (inspection of record shows that
complaint asked that defendant directors, though a majority, be enjoined from acting as
such and that corporation be compelled to perform certain agreements which would break
a contract between the corporation and a third party; in effect, therefore, the corporation
was resisting relief unfavorable to itself). See also cases cited supra notes 18 and 19.
'Harris v. Pearsall, supra note 22.
'See Brown v. De Young. 167 Ill. 549, 47 N. E. 863 (1897) ; Katz v. New England
Fuel Oil Co., 135 Me. 452, 199 Atl. 274 (1938) ; Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., 207 N. Y.
113, 100 N. E. 721 (1912) ; Brock v. Poor, supra note 15; Frank v. American Com-
mercial Alcohol Corp., 152 Misc. 123, 273 N. Y. Supp. 622 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County, 1934) ;
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At this point, it will be asked, "Are there not certain instances in which the
corporation is entitled to resist a stockholder's suit by every means in its
power? Strike suits, for example ?" Definitions of "strike suits" are likely
to vary according to one's outlook. Directors would generally concede that
actions which attack actual physidal theft of corporate assets are justified;
most other actions would probably be regarded as "strike suits," even though
there was solid legal basis for recovery. Suits to hold directors liable for
declaring dividends out of capital, or for violating some similar statutory
restriction, are thought of as being based on "technicalities," and stockholders
who attempt to take advantage of the plain words of the statute must neces-
sarily be "strikers." Such an attitude, of course, is unfair, and one can
hardly seek to justify the use of corporate funds to resist an action seeking to
impose a liability dearly intended by the legislature. A "strike suit" is
perhaps better defined as an action brought purely for its nuisance value, with
the purpose of obtaining a settlement for the complainant's sole benefit-the
amount of the proposed settlement being far greater than any possible injury
suffered by the complainant.2 6  Even a suit brought for this reason-to
induce the defendants to pay off the complainant-may be based on a good
cause of action. Are we to allow the corporation to seek to defeat a sound
legal claim, merely because the plaintiff has an unworthy motive?
Another difficult situation is presented when the complaint on its face states
a cause of action and the plaintiff is clearly acting in good faith, but the suit
is likely to do more harm than good to the corporation and its stockholders.
Take, for example, the following situation-which, though hypothetical, can
probably be duplicated in a dozen lines of business. X Corporation has
recently reconstituted its directorate, after several years of financial difficulty.
The executive who was formerly general manager is now chairman of the
board at a reduced salary. The employees are loyal to him, and his long
experience is regarded as being of great value. A stockholder now brings a
derivative suit against this individual, alleging that he mismanaged the
corporation and that the compensation he received as general manager was
excessive and should in large part be returned to the corporation. The present
members of the board of directors are joined as defendants, the complaint
Runcie v. Bankers Trust Co., 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 623 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County, 1938);
Robins v. Brooklyn Trust Co., 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 626 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County, 1938) ;
Wolf v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 103 N. Y. L. J. 416, col. 1 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County,
Jan. 26, 1940).
'See note (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rav. 1308. Cf. Davis, J., in Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs
Trading Corp., supra note 10, at 248: "Stockholders' actions (not collusive) may be
brought for three distinct purposes: one, for the genuine purpose of benefit to all stock-
holders with a determination to pursue the suit to judgment, with all stockholders invited
in good faith to join in labor and expense; two, for the purpose of individual benefit by
private settlement, with the fact of the bringing of the suit kept secret; three, a suit
brought purely for 'strike' purposes."
370 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
alleging that they have been negligent in failing to enforce the corporation's
cause of action against the principal defendant, and that they are accordingly
secondarily liable. What should the directorate do under such circumstances?
It would be easy to cause the principal defendant to sever his connection with
the business, and to cause the corporation to prosecute with vigor the alleged
claims against him. Such a course is probably the one best designed to save
the personal skins and pocketbooks of the directors. But let us assume
that the directors are honestly convinced that the individual in question is of
such great value to the corporation in his present post that any possible recovery
of past compensation-assuming it to have been excessive-would be small
in comparison. The trial would of necessity be long and involved; the
corporation's policies and inner history for the last few years would be dis-
played before the public in a partisan, perhaps even a sensational, form; the
loyalty and enthusiasm of the employees would undoubtedly suffer; the
corporation would receive much adverse publicity; competitors might gain
information which could be used to the prejudice of the company. And all
for what? The complainant may lose the suit; if he wins, the corporation will
recover an amount which will be reduced by an allowance to the attorney for
the protesting stockholder, and probably be more than counterbalanced by
the amount of time which would be spent by officers and employees in compiling
financial data, searching records, attending examinations before trial and
serving as witnesses at the trial itself. Under such circumstances a completely
unprejudiced stockholder or director must regard the litigation with dismay,
if not with indignation, for even its successful maintenance will produce more
harm than good to the persons having a real financial stake in the company.
It is easy to say that the attitude just described is shortsighted, and that in
the long run investors will benefit by the higher standards of official conduct
which the threat of such litigation will enforce. But even granting the
social desirability of the frequent maintenance of stockholders' suits, one can
still understand the legitimate hostility which can be aroused on the part of
management and majority stockholders against the maintenance of certain
types of such suits. We can go further and agree that the law should provide
some means of effectively discouraging the wrong kind of stockholder's suit.
We are not considering here the remedies available to the individual
defendants; it is true that they are able to put the facts of the case before
the court as completely as could the corporation itself,27 but it is not at all clear
that their remedies against strike suits are adequate. And certainly they
cannot defend on the ground that the suit will do the corporation more harm
than good. That is a defense peculiar to the corporation-if it is to be con-
sidered a defense at all. Can the corporation set up such a defense if the
"'See Groel v. United Electric Co. of N. J., 70 N. J. Eq. 616, 61 Atl. 1061 (1905).
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management has concluded that the suit will be harmful to the company?
No case has been found directly on the point. The decision most nearly
relevant seems to be that of the New Jersey Chancery Court in Groel v.
United Electric Co. of New Jersey.2 8 The corporation there entered a plea in
bar to the effect that the plaintiff's demand that the company bring suit on the
alleged cause of action had been rightly refused by the board of directors.
Garrison, V. C., in overruling the plea, said :29
"The formal defendant should have the right to object to and to
question the power of the complainant to bring a suit in its behalf, but
I do not think that the form in which it should raise this objection should
be by plea or answer or demurrer .... If we should adopt a practice by
which the formal defendant should raise its objection by a petition
setting forth such facts as it thought relevant and giving the reasons why
it thought the complaining stockholder should not be permitted to
prosecute a suit in its behalf, the court could, upon such an issue,
properly determine the only question that ever should be permitted to be
litigated between the formal defendant and the complainant without in
any way interfering with the real, meritorious issue against the actual
defendant."
This suggestion does not seem to have been adopted in any subsequent case.
The difficulty, of course, is that we cannot always trust the management to
decide whether the suit is groundless or whether it will in fact produce no
beneficial result. If the management is itself being sued, it certainly cannot
be counted upon to see the situation in an impartial light, and this is almost as
true when the defendants are former officers or directors. Can we say that
if the defendants constitute only a minority on the board, the remaining
directors may, if they believe the suit to be groundless, cause the corporation
to take an active part in the defense of the minority? Plausible as this
argument is, it has the practical disadvantage that the majority of the board
would be strongly tempted to maintain friendly and harmonious relations
with the minority, and would, therefore, be inclined to take part in the defense
of the minority if such a course seemed to have any justification at all. Further,
any such view would encourage stockholders' attorneys to join all of the direc-
tors as defendants from the start.8 0 Where the suit is only against third
parties, the directors can reasonably be expected to act in the interest of the
company, and it is here that we find the courts most strictly enforcing the
requirement that the board must be given an opportunity to pass on the
alleged cause of action before suit is brought.31 If, however, the demand
'Cited supra note 27. As to findings by the management that suit would be "in-
expedient," see infra note 57 and cases cited.
'70 N. J. Eq. 616, 626, 61 Atl. 1061, 1064 (1905).
'See Glickenhaus v. Anderson, infra note 39.
'See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. ed. 827 (1881) ; Huntington v. Palmer,
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requirement has been satisfied and the suit relates to matters on which the
management will probably not be impartial, we are brought squarely back to
our problem.
Is the solution to call a meeting of stockholders to pass upon the question
of what attitude should be taken by the corporation towards the pending suit?
Where action taken pursuant to a majority vote of stockholders forms the
very grievance of which the plaintiff complains, going to the stockholders a
second time might not prove very fruitful. Under other circumstances, we
will frequently find the management or the individual defendants calling a
stockholders' meeting to consider a pending suit. Sometimes this is pur-
portedly done merely to "report" to the stockholders and to obtain an expres-
sion of an "opinion." Occasionally, the individual defendants frankly state
that they wish to obtain resolutions ratifying their challenged conduct, which
they may use in defending themselves. In either case, the realities of the
situation are the same-if the defendants control a majority of the stock, they
will seek to use that control as powerfully as they possibly can in an attempt
to bar the alleged cause of action or to limit the quantum of recovery. From
a strictly technical point of view, of course, any ratifying action taken at
a stockholders' meeting may be of limited effectiveness. 32 From the practical
point of view, however, purported ratification may have an important effect.
It may gain favorable publicity for the corporation and the defendants; it
permits the raising of an additional defense, weak as it may be; and it may
well have a definite psychological effect on the court. Further, the defendants
will probably make the argument-tenuous though it may be-that there has
been a "waiver" of rights by certain of the stockholders and that, therefore,
the measure of damages should be correspondingly reduced, even though the
cause of action may not have been wiped out by ratification. 33 Accordingly, if
it is evident that there will not be sufficient disclosure of the facts and that any
action taken could not fairly represent the stockholders' views, the com-
plainant may be entitled to an injunction restraining the taking of a vote at
104 U. S. 482, 26 L. ed. 833 (1881) ; Latimer v. Richmond, etc., R. R., 39 S. C. 44, 17 S. E.
258 (1892). On the demand question generally, see infra notes 58 and 59.
'Extended treatment of the subject of ratification lies beyond the scope of this article.
It may be pointed out, however, that most stockholders' suits involve charges of mis-
appropriation of funds and similar acts, which a majority vote could not originally have
authorized; such acts, it is generally said, cannot be ratified by less than a unanimous
vote. Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 18, 99 N. E. 138 (1912);
Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., supra note 25. Cf. Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo.
74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925), and cases there cited, where the act sought to be ratified was
deemed merely voidable. And see note (1937) 4 U. OF Ciii. L. REv. 495.
'See Eshleman v. Keenan, 194 AtI. 40, 41-42 (Del. Ch. 1937), aff'd, 2 A. (2d) 904,
909-910, 120 A. L. R. 227 (Del. 1938), noted below (1937) 35 Mici. L. REv. 493; Harris
v. Waters, 112 Misc. 640, 183 N. Y. Supp. 721 (Sup. Ct., Wayne County, 1920) ; note, 120
A. L. R. 238. Cf. Proctor v. Farrar, Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods Corp., and
Sale v. Ambler, all cited infra note 40.
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the meeting.34 On the other hand, there are disadvantages to the individual
defendants in approaching the stockholders, even in a case where ratification by
majority vote might have legal effect.3 5 There is the difficulty of presenting
sufficient information to the stockholders to make their vote binding ;30 there
is the fact that going to the stockholders may indicate weakness in the
defendants' case; and there is the question of whether the defendants' votes
should be counted when the ballot is cast.37  There is also'the fact that if
stockholders are numerous, it will be difficult to arouse interest and obtain a
fair expression of their views.
These difficulties militate seriously against the submission to the stockholders
of the question whether the pending suit should be resisted by the corporation
as being groundless, malevolent, or non-beneficial. Nor can the problem be
solved by having a majority of the stockholders vote to ratify the directors'
decision not to bring suit in the name of the corporation, if under the circum-
stances a majority vote could not effectively ratify the challenged transactions.
As Judge Pitney said in a well-known New Jersey case, ratification cannot be
"accomplished indirectly under the guise of a refusal to bring an action. 3 8
On the whole, therefore, no adequate remedy is available to a corporation
against a strike or non-beneficial suit. Attempts have recently been made
to attack stockholders' suits by motions for summary judgment, but it is
probable that this relief will be granted only in exceptional circumstances.89
'Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 148, 154 Atl. 321 (1931). See also
Scott v. P. Lorillard Co., 108 N. J. Eq. 153, 154 At. 515, aff'd, 109 N. J. Eq. 417, 157 Atl.
388 (1931).
'See supra note 32.
'See Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 34; Bliss v. Linden Cemetery Ass'n,
83 N. J. Eq. 494, 91 Atl. 304 (1914), rood., 85 N. J. Eq. 501, 96 Atl. 1001 (1916).
'On this point, see United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., 96 F. (2d)
148 (C. C. A. 2d 1938); Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 Atl. 136(1911) ; Lattin, The Minority Stockholder and Intra-Corporate Conflict (1932) 17 IowA
L. REv. 313, 332; note (1929) 28 MicH. L. REv. 181.
'Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 403, 409, 65 Atl. 910, 912 (1907),
declaration of dividends from capital. Contra, Foster v. Quintal, 101 N. Y. L. J. 2434, col.
5 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County, May 26, 1939, Shientag, J.) ; majority of stockholders voted
to ratify directors' decision not to bring suit for misapplication of funds; court grants
motion (apparently by corporation) for summary judgment dismissing the derivative
action. The holding in the Foster case seems unsound, as it would permit the majority
stockholders to do indirectly what they could not do directly. See Continental Securities
Co. v. Belmont, supra note 32; Eshleman v. Keenan, supra note 33. Refusal to sue may
no doubt be effectively ratified by the majority in a case where it could ratify the chal-
lenged acts.
'In Levine v. Behn, 282 N. Y. 120, 25 N. E. (2d) 871 (1940), the Nev York
Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment dismissing a stockholder's derivative suit.
While nothing in the court's opinion indicates that summary judgment of dismissal is never
to be allowed in such actions, evidently it will seldom be permitted. In fact, defendants
in such suits will rarely be able to make as effective an attempt to comply with Rule 113,
N. Y. Rules of Civil Practice, as was made in the Levine case; yet the Court of Appeals
held the effort there to be insufficient. For the opinions below, see 169 Misc. 601, 8
N. Y. S. (2d) 58 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County, 1938, Shientag, J.) aff'd, 257 App. Div.
156, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 190 (1st Dep't 1939). The motion for summary judgment in the
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The usual means of fighting strike suits-and, all too often, legitimate suits
as well-has been to tire the plaintiff out with motions, expensive excursions
to take testimony, and the like. If the plaintiff refuses to tire, he finally gains
the privilege of going through a long and costly trial, perhaps to meet defeat,
perhaps to obtain a judgment in favor of the corporation.40  Sometimes, of
course, a settlement is made-frequently one which produces little or no
benefit to the corporation.4
1
The situation pictured in the preceding pages is obviously unsatisfactory to
the complaining stockholder, who finds the corporation able to do a good deal
to hinder him in the exercise of his principal remedy. It is unsatisfactory
also to the other stockholders-as well as to the management-in that the
courts will do little or nothing to put a complete stop to a suit which has some
technical basis but which will in fact do more harm than good to the company.
One difficulty-arising from the desire to have the corporation take an
active part in the proceedings in order to lessen the individual defendants' legal
bills-can be partly remedied by a fair and reasonable policy as to reimbursing
from corporate funds directors who have incurred, expense in defending
groundless suits. The writer has elsewhere examined the conditions under
which such a policy might be put into effect.42
The other problem-that of allowing the management and majority stock-
holders some means of ending a suit which they reasonably deem to be con-
trary to the best interests of the company-is, of course, part of the larger
problem of achieving adequate protection for the minority stockholder without
Levine case was made by certain of the individual defendants. Cf. Foster v. Quintal,
supra note 38; Glickenhaus v. Anderson, 99 N. Y. L. J. 1925, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., N. Y.
County, April 21, 1938), s.c., 99 N. Y. L. J. 2221, col. 2 (May 7, 1938), s.c., 100 N. Y.
L. J. 1562, col. 6 (Nov. 10, 1938), s.c., 101 N. Y. L. J. 1495, col. 1 (April 1, 1939). Ap-
parently in the Glickenhaus case the corporation joined in the motion for summary
judgment.
'Judgment is ordinarily entered in favor of the corporation, rather than the com-
plaining stockholder. 13 FLETcHER, CORPORATIONS (1931) § 5953; BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS (1927) 632. The complainant, however, should be intrusted with the collection of ajudgment in favor of the company. Earl v. Brewer, 248 App. Div. 314, 289 N. Y. Supp.
150 (4th Dep't 1936), aff'd w.o.op., 273 N. Y. 669, 8 N. E. (2d) 339 (1937), noted, (1936)
22 CoRr L L. Q. 105, (1937) 21 MINN. L. REv. 210. See also Proctor v. Farrar, 213
S. W. 469 (Mo. 1919) ; Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods Corp., 150 Misc. 577, 269
N. Y. Supp. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; Sale v. Ambler, 6 A. (2d) 519 (Pa. 1939).
'See McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder's Suit
(1937) 46 YALE L. J. 421, 427-431, where cases are discussed in which the courts have
given weight to the corporation's approval or disapproval of a proposed settlement; the
writer of the article reaches the conclusion that the corporation's attitude should be re-
garded as immaterial. See also Standard Home & Savings Ass'n Co. v. Jones, 64 Ohio
St. 147, 59 N. E. 885 (1901) ; United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., supra
note 37; with which compare Cutter v. Arlington Casket Co., 255 Mass. 52, 151 N. E.
167 (1926). On the question of whether approval by stockholders and court of the proposed
settlement should be required, see note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 534; McLAUGHLIN, 10c. cit.
supra at 432-435; Rule 23(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
'See Washington, supra note 21.
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at the same time unduly hampering business. What is said in the following
pages is not offered as a complete solution of the problem of the stockholder's
suit, or even of the particular problems discussed above. It is not put forward
as a cure, but as a palliative which may occasionally prove useful.
II. Another Possible Use for Corporate Funds-Providing a New
Remedy for Stockholders
How is adequate protection for minority stockholders to be obtained, without
destructive interference with legitimate business? We have seen some of the
reasons why derivative suits do not provide such protection; they are ex-
pensive, hazardous and clumsy.43 Dean Pound has well said that "these suits
have been rendered relatively ineffective by the limitations necessary to prevent
abuse of them."44 It seems clear that the passage of new and more severe
restrictive laws will not be of much help; we need observance and enforcement
of existing standards rather than new ones. Along this line, it has been
suggested that investors throughout the country should unite to form an agency
to investigate and prosecute charges of wrongdoing by management.45 A
government bureau with similar functions has'also been advocated.4 Again,
it has been pointed out that courts of equity possess a visitatorial power over
corporations, which may perhaps be invoked through information by the
attorney-general-a procedure offering certain advantages over the stock-
holder's suit.47 It has even been urged that sentence of death, through judicial
winding-up proceedings, should be more frequently used as a penalty against
corporations which have dealt unfairly with a minority.48
None of these suggestions is a complete answer to the problem. An in-
vestors' protective group has very recently been formed ;49 as yet, it has had
little opportunity to prove itself. In any event, the activities of such an agency
would doubtless be directed chiefly towards corporations in which its members
had investments. As for a government bureau to investigate and prosecute
charges of management wrongdoing, no state or federal legislation to this end
seems so far to have been passed.50 The establishment of such a bureau
"For a. good discussion of the defects of the stockholder's derivative suit, see Berlack,
supra note 20, at 600-607.
"Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rxv.
369, 395.
'See Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (1934) 47 HARV. L. Rav. 1305; RmIs,
FALSE SEcuMY (1937) 267-272.
"See Berlack, mpra note 20, at 611-614.
'See Pound, loc. cit. supra note 44.
'See Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a
Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 220.
"American Investors Union, Inc., New York City. Other agencies, unknown to the
writer, may also be functioning.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, of course, is concerned primarily with
compelling disclosure of material facts regarding securities; wide as are the Commission's
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would in itself hardly guarantee the active enforcement of high standards.
The history of the Federal Trade Commission, and of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, shows us that it is the energy and ability of the enforcing agency upon
which we must rely-and shows also how greatly the quantity and quality of
enforcement can vary from administration to administration.51 It is hardly
unfair to say that if a governmental investigating body is lazy, it is useless;
if it is active, it can very easily play havoc with the operation of vital units
in the country's economic structure. Anyone who is familiar with the Pecora
and Sabath investigations can testify as to the energy and enthusiasm
of the investigators; he can also testify to the resulting disruption of busi-
ness, the inconvenience to employees and managers, and the cost. Inquisitions
of that type may be justified once or twice in a generation, to provide the basis
for new legislation, but they certainly should not be initiated at the request
of every dissatisfied stockholder. If government can establish an agency which
is efficient and at the same time is able to investigate a business without throw-
ing it into chaos, by all means let us have it.52  The possibility seems rather
remote, however. Similarly, experience in New York would indicate that not
a great deal of hope should be placed on the possibility of appealing to the
visitatorial power of equity through informations by the attorney-general;
the New York statute providing for such relief, which has been in force for
generations, is seldom used.5 3 Nor can the idea of corporate death for the
erring company be accorded a very warm welcome, except in extreme cases.
The average dissatisfied stockholder does not want to liquidate the corporation
-he can probably sell his stock on the market for more than he would derive
from a forced break-up of the company. In the usual case, "corporate death"
might produce real harm to the community, particularly to the company's em-
ployees, without substantially benefiting the minority stockholder.
On the other hand, all of the suggestions just discussed have elements of
value. Differences in the type of business involved and in the evil which is
powers, it can hardly be described as an agency for the protection of minority stockholders.
For comments on certain activities of the Commission which do have a semi-supervisory
character, see Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations: Effect on Ability of
Corporation to Hold Valid Meeting (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 483.
'See HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936) 115-138.
'Continuous supervision of business by government agencies, which is another possible
approach to certain aspects of our problem, is not without its drawbacks. See Berlack,
supra note 20, at 607-611; Pound, supra note 44, at 395. See also Patterson, Wanted:
Directors Who Direct N. Y. Times Magazine, Jan. 21, 1940, p. 6, where it is said at p. 18:
"There are some who propose to improve the situation by having the government place
one or two public directors on the boards of companies. This, I am convinced, would
be disastrous for industry. The government might serve helpfully; there are industries in
which certain government approvals are necessary to the good of the industry and the
public. But there is no justification for government to start telling each company how to
manage its own affairs. If that happens, free private enterprise is on its way out."
'N. Y. GEN. CoRp. L. §§ 60, 61, 134. See Pound, supra note 44, at 395; Berlack, supra
note 20, at 611-612; Hornstein, supra note 48, at 243.
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sought to be eradicated will call for widely varying remedies. With full
recognition of this fact, the writer would like to call attention to still another
possible means of adjusting disputes between stockholder and management.
That possibility is simply this: to offer to the stockholder a remedy in addition
to the derivative suit-a remedy within the corporation, through the creation
of what might be called a "judicial" department.
"The judicial branch of General Motors Corporation"-the words do not
seem to make sense. Our corporate government has a highly developed
executive branch, and a rather rudimentary legislative one. The judicial
department hardly seems to exist at all. Yet already in many businesses we
find active shop committees, passing on the rights and privileges of the manual
worker, and exercising a power closely akin to the judicial. Outside the
business world, we find lodges -and labor unions with actively functioning
councils and committee which wield the power of admission to and expulsion
from membership-power that may mean the loss of livelihood, not to mention
loss of pension rights, insurance, and the like. The regularly constituted courts
accord a high degree of recognition to these minor tribunals.54 It is not a
tremendous jump from these groups to a committee, functioning within the
corporation and designed to deal with claims of stockholders against the
management.
What form could such a committee take, postponing for the moment ques-
tions as to its usefulness? In the first place, it would seem that there should
be no attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction; there must be few indeed who
would like to see the rights of stockholders-or of the management for that
matter-placed beyond the protection of law. Nor is it likely that such a
committee would have any desire to deal with legal questions. Determining
the extent of corporate power would certainly be beyond its scope. What,
then, is left? The realm of fact-which can be sufficiently vast-and of
negotiation. In other words, a Committee of Investigation and Mediation.
Why is not such a committee a perfectly legal creation? Improvement of re-
lations with stockholders, and the avoidance of unnecessary litigation, is
certainly a proper corporate purpose. 5
What would be the membership of such a committee? If we try to obtain
representation of various interests, we run into some difficult practical prob-
lems. If the group is to consist entirely of directors, it is open to the objection
"See, for example, Capra v. Local Lodge No. 273 of B. of L., F. & E., 102 Colo. 63, 76
P. (2d) 738 (1938) ; Agrippino v. Perrotti, 270 Mass. 55, 169 N. E. 793 (1930) ; Carri-
gan v. Plainfield Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n, 121 N. J. L. 559, 3 A. (2d) 587 (1939);.
West v. Pennsylvania R. R., 328 Pa. 156, 194 Atl. 912 (1937).
'Expenditures for increasing the good will of customers and employees are clearly for
proper corporate purposes. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) 218, 220. So, of course, are
expenditures for advertising. State v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 321 Mo. 461, 12 S. W. (2d)
64 (1928).
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that it is likely to be biased in favor of the management. Similarly, if it is not
composed of directors, but is elected by the stockholders, the group is still likely
to be of management selection. Proportional representation through cumu-
lative voting might meet the difficulty, but even here we still have the question
of what interests are in fact being represented. Certain stockholders may see
eye to eye with the management on some matters but not on others. "Minori-
ties" on one question may be part of the "majority" on others. One approach
might be to rely on the standards set by the legal and accounting professions,
and choose for our committee lawyers and accountants well and favorably
known in their professions. Such a committee might be composed of a director,
a lawyer, and an accountant, to be chosen annually by the stockholders.. Pro-
fessional standards, after all, constittite one of the ultimate bases of reliance
when we select judges for our regular courts. In any event, a corporation
desiring to establish such a committee would doubtless have many individual
problems, requiring individual solution. One of these problems is, of course,
that of compensation to the committee members, which, it would seem, should
be from corporate funds? 6
Suppose we do establish a committee of this type. What good would it do?
It seems to the writer that at worst it would do very little harm, and might
occasionally do a great deal of good. A stockholder who wishes to attack a
proposed issue of stock to the officers will not be able to profit from the
existence of the committee-he will no doubt seek immediate injunctive relief.
On the other hand, take the case of a stockholder who suspects that the directors
were negligent and wasteful in purchasing a certain tract of land. If he applies
'to the committee for a statement of the facts, nothing the committee can do
in the matter will jeopardize his rights.5 7 If the committee renders a report
white-washing the transaction, the stockholder at least gets an idea of what
the defense will be. If the committee reports that there is a cause of action,
the stockholder's bargaining position is greatly improved, and there is likely
to be a prompt settlement. If the committee delays in making its investigation,
or if the Statute of Limitations is about to bar the action, the stockholder can
at any time start suit. Further, the fact that the committee is in existence will
tend to make the executives toe the mark. Such a group could have a very
healthy influence on the management.
From the other side, what benefit does the management get out of the
'A fair basis of compensation could doubtless be worked out. Ordinarily, payment
based on hours served would seem to be more appropriate than a fixed salary.
'"A finding by the board of directors, or by a committee of directors, that a proposed suit
would be "inexpedient," is not in itself sufficient to bar a stockholder's derivative suit on
the same cause of action. Groel v. United Electric Co. of N. J., upra note 27; Siegman
v. Electric Vehicle Co., supra note 38; Goodbody v. Delaney, 82 N. J. Eq. 140, 91 Atl.
724- (1913). See also United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., supra note 37.
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arrangement? First of all, by the very fact of its having created such a com-
mittee, the management may gain considerable stockholder good will. Sec-
ondly, there are many situations that cannot adequately be defended in court,
for various reasons, but can be explained to the satisfaction of a reasonable
inquirer. A certain contract, for example, may have been clearly improvident,
but may subsequently have led to a profitable business arrangement; this new
arrangement might well be lost if the whole transaction were aired in court.
Explanations of this sort often meet with disbelief when made by the man-
agement, even though there is nothing sinister about the transaction. A
similar explanation by a disinterested group might meet with readier ac-
ceptance. In any case, a stockholder who does decide to sue after receiving and
rejecting the committee's report is likely to be more restrained in the language
of his complaint than he would be otherwise. It is difficult even for a
hardened strike-suiter to call the executives defrauders and criminals after
they have listened to a grievance with courtesy and caused an investigation to
be made by a committee consisting largely of outsiders. A moderate com-
plaint means less newspaper comment and less damage to good will.
And, finally, there is the possibility that the courts might welcome the estab-
lishment of such committees. To quote:
".. . before the shareholder is permitted in his own name to institute
and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to the corporation, he
should show to the satisfaction of the court that he has exhausted all the
means within his reach to obtain, within the corporation itself, the redress
of his grievances, or action in conformity to his wishes." Hawes v. Oak-
land, 104 U. S. 450, 460, 26 L. ed. 827 (1881), per Mr. Justice Miller.
"A stockholder, before he can proceed in his own name but in behalf
of the corporation for the redress of wrongs done to it, must establish
that he has exhausted all available means to obtain relief through the
corporation itself, unless the circumstances excuse him from so doing.
That is a condition precedent .... It is an implied condition of becoming
a stockholder in a corporation that its general policy shall be determined
by the holders of a majority of the stock and that disagreements as to its
dominating policy and as to the details of its management shall be settled
by the stockholders, and that recourse cannot be had to the courts to adjust
difficulties of this sort. It is only from actual necessity, in order to pre-
vent a failure of justice, that a suit in equity for the benefit of the corpora-
tion can be maintained by a stockholder." Bartlett v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford R. R., 221 Mass. 530, 532, 109 N. E. 452 (1915),
per Rugg, C. J.
"In addition, it is the spirit of the rule as repeatedly interpreted in
federal decisions that stockholders bringing derivative action shall ex-
haust every remedy within the corporation before suing. . . ." Long v.
Stites, 88 F. (2d) 554, 556 (C. C. A. 6th 1937), per Allen, Cir. J.
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These statements were dicta, made in the course of opinions dealing with
the necessity of demand on the board of directors, or perhaps on the stock-
holders, 58 before suit is brought. The courts were restating the rule that
demand must be made, unless excused, 59 and were emphasizing the point that
the plaintiff must exhaust the "internal remedies" provided by the corporation.
If the corporation provides a better internal remedy than mere recourse to
the board of directors-by offering the services of a disinterested committee
accustomed to deal with similar problems and perhaps selected through a
process in which the complainant has some voice-is it not reasonable to
suppose that the courts would require the complainant to exhaust the pos-
sibilities of relief offered by the committee before appealing to equity ?60 The
board of directors, it is true, has power to bring suit in the corporation's name
to enforce the alleged cause of action, whereas the committee would have
power only to investigate the facts and attempt to produce harmony by media-
tion. But the committee's services are still valuable-it is offering a useful
remedy, even though not a complete one. The board of directors itself does
not offer a complete remedy: it cannot enter a judgment against the wrong-
doers, but can merely prosecute a suit against them.
It will be objected that the strike-suiter will simply allege that the com-
mittee is corrupt, that it is part of a conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff, and
that, hence, it would be "useless" for him to deal with the committee, just as
it is "useleSs" to make a demand on the board of directors. Possibly so.
'It is generally said that the aggrieved stockholder must make a demand on the board
of directors that the corporation bring suit on account of the alleged wrong; if the board
refuses, and the matter is one within the control of the stockholders, he must make demand
on the stockholders as a body that they sue the directors or take other action to remedy
the wrong; if the stockholders take no action, his own suit may follow. See STEVENS,
CORPORATIONS (1936) 668-671; 13 FLETcHER, CORPORATIONS (1931) §§ 5963-5970; 72 A.
L. R. 628; note (1939) 6 U. OF CHr. L. REV. 269; note (1932) 15 MINN. L. REV. 453. See
also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(b), discussed supra note 13. As to cir-
cumstances excusing such demands, see infra note 59.
'Allegations that the wrongdoers "control" the board of directors are generally held
sufficient to excuse a demand on the board; if the wrong is one which the stockholders
could not ratify, or adequately redress, a demand on the stockholders is generally excused.
See authorities cited supra note 58.
'It may be noted that if the corporation is in receivership the stockholder must ordi-
narily seek redress through the receiver before being permitted to maintain a derivative
action. Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N. Y. 257, 179 N. E. 487 (1932) ; Koral v. Savory, Inc.,
supra note 2. Reference may also be made to the decision of Judge Cotillo in Busch
Jewelry Co., Inc. v. United Retail Employees Union Local 830, 169 Misc. 854, 9 N. Y. S.(2d) 167, 169, 172 (Sup. Ct. 1939), where an employer sought an injunction against picket-
ing. The court said: ". . . in these labor disputes there are too often less legal problems
to be solved than social, economic and even political ones. . . . By virtue of this con-
viction, I have decided that this dispute can and should be settled by conciliation and
arbitration. . . . I therefore appoint three men of learning, ability and experience [as a
Committee to hear and report]." The subsequent history of the case is traced in
MARIANO, THE BuscH JEWELRY LABOR INJUNCrION (1940) 132 et seq. See also Hechler
v. Emery, 133 Misc. 689, 234 N. Y. Supp. 46 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. County, 1928, Levy, J.), a
stockholder's action in which the trial judge requested the board of directors to meet with
him to discuss the grievances alleged.
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But would the courts accept these allegations at face value? Suppose we have
a committee composed of a non-executive director, a leading accountant, and
a well-known lawyer-perhaps a retired judge. Unsupported statements that
all three of these individuals were corrupt and prejudiced would have short
shrift at the hands of a good many courts. The experienced judge generally
knows a striker when he sees one, and will be only too glad to tell him that he
must bring his grievance to the committee before going to the courts. There
will, as has been indicated, be many instances in which the complainant will
be entitled to go directly to the courts, as where injunctive relief is asked, or
the Statute of Limitations is about to bar the action.61
Is there any body of experience which would help us to estimate the
probable usefulness of such a committee? As far as the writer knows, there
is none. Boards of directors frequently name committees of their own mem-
bers, or of stockholders, to investigate charges of misappropriation and the
like; these committees often do very useful work.62  Sometimes such com-
mittees are named after a stockholder's action has started. But the writer
knows of no committee which has been formed as a permanent or quasi-
permanent body, with predominantly a disinterested membership. The Du
Pont Company has recently named three non-executive directors as an Audit
Committee, empowered to supervise the auditing of the company's accounts. 63
It is not a far cry from such a committee to a group of the kind here under
discussion, and perhaps the functions of the two might be combined.
As has been said above, the possibility which is here being discussed is
not offered as a complete solution for the problem of the stockholder's suit.
But it is a step which an individual corporation can take on its own respons-
ibility, without amending its charter, without new legislation, and without
submitting to a new form of government control. Such a plan may have only
a limited usefulness. It may be appropriate only for a few large companies.
Yet, under proper conditions, it may offer an opportunity for business to take
a more constructive role in the adjustment of intracorporate difficulties.
'A striker might be tempted to make sham allegations along these lines, to avoid
going to the committee, presenting a situation with which a court might have some
difficulty in dealing, unless it were willing to cut the Gordian knot by taking jurisdiction
over matters allegedly calling for immediate court action, and requiring the stockholder
to submit all other matters to the committee.
'For a discussion of the valuable work done by the Stockholders Investigating Com-
mittee of the Texas Corporation, see Douglas, supra note 45, at 1308-1314. This com-
mittee was formed to investigate an extended conflict between tvo factions on the Cor-
poration's board. The committee's chairman was an individual acceptable to both groups;
the chairman then selected two other stockholders to act with him. Rules of procedure
were adopted; hearings were held; and a report was issued.
'See Annual Report (1939), E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company, p. 21.
